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Abstract. We view a distributed system as a graph of active locations
with unidirectional channels between them, through which they pass
messages. In this context, the graph structure of a system constrains the
propagation of information through it.
Suppose a set of channels is a cut set between an information source and
a potential sink. We prove that, if there is no disclosure from the source
to the cut set, then there can be no disclosure to the sink. We introduce
a new formalization of partial disclosure, called blur operators, and show
that the same cut property is preserved for disclosure to within a blur
operator. A related compositional principle ensures limited disclosure for
a class of systems that differ only beyond the cut. October 5, 2018
1 Introduction
In this paper, we consider information flow in a true-concurrency, distributed
model. Events in an execution may be only partially ordered, and locations com-
municate via synchronous message-passing. Each message traverses a channel.
The locations and channels form a directed graph.
Evidently, the structure of this graph constrains the flow of information.
Distant locations may have considerable information about each other’s actions,
but only if the information in intermediate regions accounts for this. If a kind
of information does not traverse the boundary of some portion of the graph (a
cut set), then it can never be available beyond that. We represent these limits
on disclosure, i.e. kinds of information that do not escape, using blur operators.
A blur operator returns a set of behaviors local to the information source; these
should be indistinguishable to the observer. When disclosure from a source to
a cut set is limited to within a blur operator, then disclosure to a more distant
region is limited to within the same blur operator (see Thm. 27, the cut-blur
principle).
Thus, disclosure to within a blur operator is similar to other forms of what -
dimension declassification [50]. Blur operators are our formalization of the se-
mantic content of limited disclosures. The cut-blur principle combines this with
a where-dimension perspective. It gives a criterion that localizes those disclosure
limits within a system architecture.
A related result, Thm. 31, supports compositional security. Consider any
other system that differs from a given one only in its structure beyond the
⋆ Copyright c© 2015 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved.
cut. That system will preserve the flow limitations of the first, assuming that
it has the same local behaviors as the first in the cut set. We illustrate this
(Examples 32–33) to show that secrecy and anonymity properties of a firewall
and a voting system are preserved under some environmental changes. Flow
properties of a simple system remain true for more complex systems, if the
latter do not distort the behavior of the simple system.
Our model is intended for many types of systems, including networks, soft-
ware architectures, virtualized systems, and distributed protocols such as voting
systems. Our (somewhat informal) examples are meant to be suggestive. Network
examples, which involve little local state, are easy to describe, and rely heavily
on the directed graph structure. Blur operators pay off by allowing many of their
security goals now to be regarded as information-flow properties. Voting systems
offer an interesting notion of limited disclosure, since they must disclose the re-
sult but not the choices of the individual voters. Their granularity encourages
composition, since votes are aggregated from multiple precincts (Example 33).
Motivation. A treatment of information flow—relying on the graph structure
of distributed systems—facilitates compositional security design and analysis.
Many systems have a natural graph structure, which is determined early in
the design process. Some are distributed systems where the components are on
separate platforms, and the communication patterns are a key part of the spec-
ifications. In other cases, the components may be software, such as processes or
virtual machines, and the security architecture is largely concerned with their
communication patterns. The designers may want to validate that these com-
munication patterns support the information flow goals of the design early in
the life cycle. Thm. 31 justifies the designers in concluding that a set of eventual
systems all satisfy these security goals, when those systems all agree on “the
part that really matters.”
Contributions of this paper. Our main result is the cut-blur principle,
Thm. 27. The definition of blur operator is a supplementary contribution. We
show that any reasonable notion of partial disclosure satisfies the conditions for
a blur (Lemma 22); these conditions are simple structural properties that shape
the proof of the cut-blur principle. Thm. 31 brings the ideas to a compositional
form.
Structure of this paper. After discussing motivating examples (Section 2)
and some related work (Section 3), we introduce our systems, called frames, and
their execution model in Section 4. This is a static model, in the sense that the
channels connecting different locations do not change during execution. Section 5
proves the cut-blur principle for the simple case of no disclosure of information
at all across the boundary.
We introduce blur operators (Section 6) to formalize partial disclosure. In
Section 7, we show that the cut idea is also applicable to blurs (Thms. 27, 31).
Section 8 provides rigorous results to relate our model to the literature. We
end by indicating some future directions. Appendix A contains longer proofs,
and additional lemmas.
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Fig. 1. A Two-Router Firewall
2 Two Motivating Examples
We first propose two problems we view in terms of information flow. One is about
network filtering; the other concerns anonymity in voting. In each, we want to
prove an information flow result once, and then reuse it compositionally under
variations that do not affect the part that really matters.
Example 1 (Network filtering). Fig. 1 shows a two-router firewall separat-
ing the public internet (node i) from two internal network regions n1, n2. The
firewall should ensure that any packet originating in the internal regions n1, n2
reaches i only if it satisfies some property of its source and destination ad-
dresses, protocol, and port (etc.); we will call these packets exportable. Likewise,
any packet originating in i reaches n1, n2 only if it satisfies a related property of
its source and destination addresses, protocol, and port (etc.); we will call these
packets importable.
These are information flow properties. The policy provides confidentiality for
non-exportable packets within n1, n2, ensuring that they are not observable at i.
It provides a kind of integrity protection for n1, n2 from non-importable packets
from i, ensuring that n1, n2 cannot be damaged, or affected at all, if they are
malicious.
We assume here that packets are generated independently, so that (e.g.) no
process on a host in n1, n2 generates exportable packets encoding confidential
non-exportable packets it has sent or received. If some process on a host is ob-
serving packets and coding their contents into packets to a different destination,
this is a problem firewalls were not designed to solve, and security administrators
worry about it separately.
A firewall configuration enforcing a flow goal against the internet viewed as a
single node i should still succeed if i has internal structure. Similarly, the internal
regions n1, n2 may vary without risk of security failure. ///
We will return to this example several times to illustrate how we formalize the
system and specify its flow goals. Example 32 proves that some information flow
goals of Fig. 1 remain true as the structure of i, n1, n2 varies.
Example 2. As another key challenge, consider an electronic voting system
such as ThreeBallot [40]. Fig. 2 shows the voters v1, . . . , vk of a single precinct,
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Fig. 3. Multiple precincts report to EC
their ballot box BB1, a channel delivering the results to the election commission
EC , and then a public bulletin board Pub that reports the results.
The ballot box should provide voter anonymity: neither EC nor anyone ob-
serving the results Pub should be able to associate any particular vote with any
particular voter vi. This also is an information flow goal.
However, elections generally concern many precincts. Fig. 3 contains i precincts,
all connected to the election commission EC . Intuitively, a voter vn cannot lose
their anonymity in the larger system: BB1 has already anonymized the votes in
this first precinct. Accumulating precinct summaries at EC cannot change the
causal consequences of BB1’s actions. ///
We formalize the flow goals of this example in Example 25, and extend the results
to Fig. 3 in Example 33.
These simple examples illustrate the payoff from a compositional approach
to flow goals. Conclusions about a firewall should be insensitive to changes in
the structure of the networks to which it is attached. An anonymity property
achieved by a ballot mechanism should be preserved as we collect votes from
many precincts. These are situations where we want to design and reuse mecha-
nisms, with a criterion to ensure the mechanism is remains safe under changes in
the part that does not really matter. Thm. 31 below is the criterion we propose.
3 Some related work
We return to related work also in Sections 8–9.
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Noninterference and nondeducibility. There is a massive literature on
information-flow security; Goguen and Meseguer were key early contributors [22].
Sutherland introduced the non-deducibility idea [51] as a way to formalize lack
of information flow, which we have adopted in our “non-disclosure” (Def. 11).
Subsequent work has explored a wide range of formalisms, including state ma-
chines [45]; process algebras such as CSP [42,41,46] and CCS [20,21,8]; and be-
spoke formalisms [35,28].
Irvine, Smith, and Volpano reinvigorated a language-based approach [54], in-
herited from Denning and Denning [18], in which systems are programs. Typing
ensures that their behaviors satisfy information-flow goals. Sabelfeld and My-
ers [48] reviewed the early years of this approach. Distributed execution has been
considered in language-based work, e.g. [57,11,7]. Our work here is not specif-
ically language-based, since the behaviors of our locations are defined only as
sets of traces. If these behaviors are specified as programs, however, our results
may be usefully combined with language-based methods.
Declassification. Declassification is a major concern for us. A blur operator
(Def. 21) determines an upper bound on what a system may declassify. It may de-
classify information unless its blur operators require those details to be blurred
out. Like escape-hatches [49], this is disclosure along the what -dimension, in
the Sabelfeld-Sands classification [50]. The cut-blur principle connects this what
declassification to where the processing responsible for the declassification will
occur in a system architecture. In this regard, it combines a semantic view of
what information is declassified with an architectural view related to intran-
sitive noninterference [45,52]. Balliu et al. [6] connect what, where, and when
declassification via epistemic logic, although without a compositional method.
McCamant and Ernst [33] study quantitative information flow when pro-
grams run. A directed acyclic graph representing information flow is generated
dynamically by inspecting a particular execution or set of executions. The max-
flow/min-cut theorem then bounds flow through the program by what can tra-
verse minimal cuts. Apparently, they do not ensure that every possible execution
will respect the bounds. They do not provide a compositional way to reuse flow
conclusions like our main theorems.
Composability and refinement. McCullough first raised the questions of
non-determinism and composability of information-flow properties [34,35]. This
was a major focus of work through much of the period since, persisting until to-
day [27,56,29,30,44,39]. Mantel, Sands, and Sudbrock [31] use a rely/guarantee
method for compositional reasoning about flow in the context of imperative
programs. Roscoe [43,42] offers a definition based on determinism, which is in-
trinsically composable. Morgan’s [38] programming language treatment clarifies
the refinements that preserve security. Our results do not run afoul of the refine-
ment paradox either [26,38]: our theorems identify the assumptions that ensure
that blurs are preserved.
Van der Meyden [53] provides an architectural treatment designed to achieve
preservation under refinement. Our work is distinguished from it in offering a
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new notion of composition, illustrated in Examples 1–2; in focusing on declassi-
fication; and in applying uniformly to a range of declassification policies, defined
by the blur operators.
Van der Meyden’s work with Chong [12,13] is most closely related to ours.
They consider “architectures,” i.e. directed graphs that express an intransitive
noninterference style of what -dimension flow policy. The nodes of an architecture
are security domains, intended to represent levels of information sensitivity. The
authors define when a (monolithic) deterministic state machine, whose transi-
tions are annotated by domains, complies with an architecture. The main result
in [12] is a cut-like epistemic property on the architecture graph: Roughly, any
knowledge acquired by a recipient about a source implies that the same knowl-
edge is available at every cut set in the architecture graph.
A primary contrast between this paper and [12] is our distributed execution
model. We consider it a more localized link to development, since components are
likely to be designed, implemented, and upgraded piecemeal. Chong and van der
Meyden focus instead on the specification level, in which security specifications
(rather than system components) form the directed graph. This is a new and
unfamiliar artifact needed before analysis can occur. Their epistemic logic allows
nested occurrences of the knowledge modality KG, or occurrences of KG in the
hypothesis of an implication. However, this surplus extra expressiveness is not
used in their examples, which do not have nested KG operators, or occurrences
of KG in the hypothesis of an implication. Indeed, our clean proof methods
suggest that our model may have the right degree of generality, and be easy to
understand, apply, and enrich.
Recently [13], they label the arrows by functions f , where f filters information
from its source, bounding visibility to its target. They have not re-established
their cut-like epistemic property in the richer model, however.
Van der Meyden and Chong’s refinement method [53,13] applies when the
refined system has a homomorphism onto the less refined one. Although it may
cover Example 1, it does not cover Example 2, where the refined system contains
genuinely new components and events.
4 Frames and Executions
We represent systems by frames. Each frame is a directed graph. Each node,
called a location, is equipped with a set of traces defining its possible local be-
haviors. The arrows are called channels, and allow the synchronous transmission
of a message from the location at the arrow tail to the location at the arrow
head. Each message also carries some data.
4.1 The Static Model
In this paper, we will be concerned with a static version of the model, in which
channel endpoints are never transmitted from one location to another, although
we will briefly describe a dynamic alternative in Section 9, in which channels
may also be delivered over other channels.
6
Definition 3 (Frame). A (static) frame F has three disjoint domains:
Locations LO: Each location ℓ ∈ LO is equipped with a set of traces, traces(ℓ)
and other information, further constrained below.
Channels CH: Each channel c ∈ CH is equipped with two endpoints, entry(c)
and exit(c). It is intended as a one-directional conduit of data values between
the endpoints.
Data values D: Data values v ∈ D may be delivered through channels.
We will write EP for the set of channel endpoints, which we formalize as EP =
{entry, exit}×CH, although we will generally continue to type entry(c) and exit(c)
to stand for 〈entry, c〉 and 〈exit, c〉. For each ℓ ∈ LO, there is:
1. a set of endpoints ends(ℓ) ⊆ EP such that
(a) 〈e, c〉 ∈ ends(ℓ) and 〈e, c〉 ∈ ends(ℓ′) implies ℓ = ℓ′; and
(b) there is an ℓ such that entry(c) ∈ ends(ℓ) iff
there is an ℓ′ such that exit(c) ∈ ends(ℓ′);
When entry(c) ∈ ends(ℓ) we will write sender(c) = ℓ; when exit(c) ∈ ends(ℓ) we
will write rcpt(c) = ℓ. Thus, sender(c) is the location that can send messages on
c, while rcpt(c) is the recipient location that can receive them. We write chans(ℓ)
for {c : sender(c) = ℓ or rcpt(c) = ℓ}.
We say that λ is a label for ℓ if λ = (c, v) where c ∈ chans(ℓ) and v ∈ D.
We divide labels into local, transmission, and reception labels, where c, v is:
local to ℓ if sender(c) = ℓ = rcpt(c);
a transmission for ℓ if sender(c) = ℓ 6= rcpt(c);
a reception for ℓ if sender(c) 6= ℓ = rcpt(c).
2. a prefix-closed set traces(ℓ), each trace being a finite or infinite sequence of
labels λ. ///
In this definition, we do not require that the local behaviors traces(ℓ) should
be determined in any particular way. They could be specified by associating a
program to each location, or a term in a process algebra, or a labeled transition
system, or a mixture of these for the different locations.
Each F determines directed and undirected graphs, gr(F) and ungr(F):
Definition 4. If F is a frame, then the graph of F , written gr(F), is the directed
graph (V,E) whose vertices V are the locations LO, and such that there is an
edge (ℓ1, ℓ2) ∈ E iff, for some c ∈ CH, sender(c) = ℓ1 and rcpt(c) = ℓ2.
The undirected graph ungr(F) has those vertices, and an undirected edge
(ℓ1, ℓ2) whenever either (ℓ1, ℓ2) or (ℓ2, ℓ1) is in the edges of gr(F). ///
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4.2 Execution semantics
We give an execution model for a frame via partially ordered sets of events. The
key property is that the events that involve any single location ℓ should be in
traces(ℓ). Our semantics is reminiscent of Mattern [32], although his model lacks
the underlying graph structure. We require executions to be well-founded, but
none of the results in this paper depend on the assumption.
Definition 5 (Events; Executions). Let F be a frame, and let E be a structure
〈E, chan,msg〉. The members of E are events, equipped with the functions:
chan : E → CH returns the channel of each event; and
msg : E → D returns the message communicated in each event.
1. B = (B,) is a system of events, written B ∈ ES(E), iff (i) B ⊆ E; (ii) 
is a partial ordering on B; and (iii), for every e1 ∈ B, {e0 ∈ B : e0  e1} is
finite.
Hence, B is well-founded. If B = (B,), we refer to B as ev(B) and to  as
B. Now let B = (B,) ∈ ES(E):
2. Define proj(B, ℓ) =
{e ∈ B : sender(chan(e)) = ℓ or rcpt(chan(e)) = ℓ}.
3. B is an execution, written B ∈ Exc(F) iff, for every ℓ ∈ LO,
(a) proj(B, ℓ) is linearly ordered by , and
(b) proj(B, ℓ) yields an element of traces(ℓ) when viewed as a sequence. ///
By Def. 5, Clauses 1 and 3a, proj(B, ℓ) is a finite or infinite sequence, ordered
by . Thus Clause 3b is well-defined. We will often write A,A′, etc., when
A,A′ ∈ Exc(F). For a frame F , the choice between two different structures
E1, E2 makes little difference: If E1, E2 have the same cardinality, then to within
isomorphism they lead to the same systems of events and hence also executions.
Thus, we will suppress the parameter E , henceforth.
Definition 6. Let B1 = (B1,1),B2 = (B2,2) ∈ ES(F).
1. B1 is a substructure of B2 iff B1 ⊆ B2 and 1 = (2 ∩B1 ×B1).
2. B1 is an initial substructure of B2 iff it is a substructure of the latter, and
for all y ∈ B1, if x 2 y, then x ∈ B1. ///
Lemma 7. 1. If B1 is a substructure of B2 ∈ ES(F), then B1 ∈ ES(F).
2. If B1 is an initial substructure of B2 ∈ Exc(F), then B1 ∈ Exc(F).
3. Being an execution is preserved under chains of initial substructures: Suppose
that 〈Bi〉i∈N is a sequence where each Bi ∈ Exc(F), such that i ≤ j implies
Bi is an initial substructure of Bj. Then (
⋃
i∈N Bi) ∈ Exc(F). ///
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Example 8 (Network with filtering). To localize our descriptions of func-
tionality, we expand the network of Fig 1; see Fig. 4. Regions are displayed as •;
routers, as ⊓⊔; and interfaces, as △. When a router has an interface onto a seg-
ment, a pair of locations—representing that interface as used in each direction—
lie between this router and each peer router [23].
Let Dir = {inb, outb} represent the inbound direction and the outbound
directions from routers, respectively. Suppose Rt is a set of routers r, each with
a set of interfaces intf(r), and a set of network regions Rg containing end hosts.
Each member of Rt,Rg is a location. Each interface-direction pair (i, r) ∈
(
⋃
r∈Rt intf(r)) × Dir is also a location. The channels are those shown. Each in-
terface has a pair of channels that allow datagrams to pass between the router
and the interface, and between the interface and an adjacent entity. We also
include a self-loop channel at each network region i, n1, n2; it represents trans-
missions and receptions among the hosts and network infrastructure coalesced
into the region. Thus:
LO = Rt ∪ Rg ∪ ((
⋃
r∈Rt intf(r)) × Dir);
CH = {(ℓ1, ℓ2) ∈ LO × LO : ℓ1 delivers datagrams directly to ℓ2};
D = the set of IP datagrams;
ends(ℓ) = {entry(ℓ, ℓ2) : (ℓ, ℓ2) ∈ CH} ∪ {exit(ℓ1, ℓ) : (ℓ1, ℓ) ∈ CH},
for each ℓ ∈ LO.
Behaviors are easily specified. Each router r ∈ Rt receives packets from inbound
interfaces, and chooses an outbound interface for each. Its state is a set of received
but not yet routed datagrams, and the sole initial state is ∅. The transition
relation, when receiving a datagram, adds it to this set. When transmitting a
datagram d in the current set, it removes d from the next state and selects an
outbound channel as determined by the routing table. For simplicity, the routing
table is an unchanging part of determining the transition relation.
A directed interface enforces filtering rules. The state again consists of the
set of received but not-yet-processed datagrams. The transition relation uses an
unchanging filter function to determine, for each datagram, whether to discard
it or retransmit it.
If n ∈ Rg is a region, its state is the set of datagrams it has received and not
yet retransmitted. It can receive a datagram; transmit one from its state; or else
initiate a new datagram. If assumed to be well-configured, these all have source
address in a given range of IP addresses. Otherwise, they may be arbitrary. ///
If the router is executing other sorts of processing, for instance Network
Address Translation or the IP Security Protocols, then the behavior is slightly
more complex [2,23], but sharply localized. Many other problems can be viewed
as frames. We have mentioned voting schemes (Ex. 2). An attestation architec-
ture for secure virtualized systems [15] is, at one level, a set of virtual machines
communicating through one-directional channels.
Partially vs. totally ordered executions. Def. 5 does not require the order-
ing  of “occurring before” to be total. When events occur on different channels,
neither has to precede the other. Thus, our executions need not be sequential.
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Fig. 4. Expanded representation of network from Fig. 1
This has three advantages. First, it is more inclusive, since executions with
total orders satisfy our definition as do those with (properly) partial orders.
Indeed, the main claims of this paper remain true when restricted to executions
that are totally ordered. Second, reasoning is simplified. We do not need to
interleave events when combining two local executions to construct a global one,
as encapsulated in the proof of Lemma 40. Nor do we need to “compact” events,
when splitting off a local execution, as we would if we used a particular index set
for sequences. This was probably an advantage to us in developing these results.
Third, the minimal partial order is a reflection of causality, which can be used
also to reason about independence. We expect this to be useful in future work.
There is also a disadvantage: unfamiliarity. It requires some caution. More-
over, mechanized theorem provers have much better support for induction over
sequences than over well-founded orders. This was an inconvenience when a col-
league used PVS to formalize parts of this work, eventually choosing to use
totally ordered executions. With that difference, Thms. 27 and 31 have been
confirmed in PVS, as have the basic properties of Example 33.
5 Non-disclosure
Following Sutherland [51], we think of information flow in terms of deducibility
or disclosure. A participant observes part of the system behavior, trying to draw
conclusions about a different part. If his observations exclude some possible
behaviors of that part, then he can deduce that those behaviors did not occur.
His observations have disclosed something.
These observations occur on a set of channels Co ⊆ CH, and the deductions
constrain the events on a set of channels Cs ⊆ CH. Co is the set of observed
channels, and Cs is the set of source channels. The observer has access to the
events on the channels in Co in an execution, using these events to learn about
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what happened at the source. The observed events may rule out some behaviors
on the channels Cs.
Definition 9. Let C ⊆ CH, and B ∈ ES(F).
1. The restriction B |` C of B to C is (B0, R), where
B0 = {e ∈ B : chan(e) ∈ C}, and
R = ( ∩ B0 ×B0).
2. B ∈ ES(F) is a C-run iff for some A ∈ Exc(F), B = A |` C. We write
C-runs(F), or sometimes C-runs, for the set of C-runs of F . A local run is
a member of C-runs for the relevant C.
3. JC′⊳C(B) gives the C′-runs compatible with a C-run B:
JC′⊳C(B) = {A |` C
′ : A ∈ Exc(F) and A |` C = B}. ///
B |` C ∈ ES(F) by Lemma 7. In JC′⊳C(B), the lower right index C indicates what
type of local run B is. The lower left index C′ indicates the type of local runs in
the resulting set. J stands for “joint.” JC′⊳C(B) makes sense even if C and C′
overlap, though behavior on C ∩ C′ is not hidden from observations at C.
Lemma 10. 1. C-runs = JC⊳∅(∅, ∅), i.e. the local runs at C are all those com-
patible with the empty event set (∅, ∅) at the empty set of channels.
2. B 6∈ C-runs implies JC′⊳C(B) = ∅.
3. B ∈ C-runs implies JC⊳C(B) = {B}.
4. JC′⊳C(B) ⊆ C
′-runs. ///
No disclosure means that any observation B at C is compatible with everything
that could have occurred at C′, where compatible means that there is some
execution that combines the local C-run with the desired C′-run.
We summarize “no disclosure” by the Leibnizian slogan: Everything possible
is compossible, “compossible” being his coinage meaning possible together. If
B,B′ are each separately possible—being C,C′-runs respectively—then there’s
an execution A combining them, and restricting to each of them.
Definition 11. F has no disclosure from C to C′ iff, for all C-runs B, JC′⊳C(B) =
C′-runs. ///
5.1 Symmetry of disclosure
Like Shannon’s mutual information and Sutherland’s non-deducibility [51], “no
disclosure” is symmetric:
Lemma 12. 1. B′ ∈ JC′⊳C(B) iff B ∈ JC⊳C′(B′).
2. F has no disclosure from C to C′ iff F has no disclosure from C′ to C.
Proof. 1. By the definition, B′ ∈ JC′⊳C(B) iff there exists an execution B1 such
that B1 |` C = B and B1 |` C′ = B′. Which is equivalent to B ∈ JC⊳C′(B′).
2. There is no disclosure from C′ to C if for every C-run B, for every C′-run B′,
B′ ∈ JC′⊳C(B). By Clause 1, this is the same as B ∈ JC⊳C′(B′). ⊓⊔
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Because of this symmetry, we speak of no disclosure between C and C′.
A witnesses for B′ ∈ JC′⊳C(B) iff A ∈ Exc(F), B = A |` C, and B′ = A |` C′.
We also sometimes say that B1 witnesses for B
′ ∈ JC′⊳C(B) if B1 ∈ C1-runs,
where C ∪ C′ ⊆ C1, when B1 |` C = B and B1 |` C′ = B′.
Lemma 13. 1. Suppose C0 ⊆ C1 and C′0 ⊆ C
′
1. If F has no disclosure from
C1 to C
′
1, then F has no disclosure from C0 to C
′
0.
2. When C1, C2, C3 ⊆ CH,
JC3⊳C1(B1) ⊆
⋃
B2∈JC2⊳C1(B1)
JC3⊳C2(B2). ///
This is not an equality. B1 and B2 may make incompatible demands on a location
ℓ. It may have endpoints on channels in both C1 and C3; or paths may connect
ℓ to both C1 and C3 without traversing C2. Lemma 15 shows that otherwise
equality holds. See Appendix A for this proof, and the longer subsequent proofs.
5.2 The Cut Principle for Non-disclosure
Our key observation is that non-disclosure respects the graph structure of a frame
F . If cut ⊆ CH is a cut set in the undirected graph ungr(F), then disclosure from
a source set src ⊆ CH to a sink obs ⊆ CH is controlled by disclosure to cut. If
there is no disclosure from src to cut, there can be no disclosure from src to obs.
As we will see in Section 7, this property extends to limited disclosure in the
sense of disclosure to within a blur operator.
We view a cut as separating one set of channels as source from another set
of channels as sink. Although it is more usual to take a cut to separate sets
of nodes than sets of channels, it is easy to transfer between the channels and
the relevant nodes. If C ⊆ CH, we let ends(C) = {ℓ : ∃c ∈ C . sender(c) = ℓ or
rcpt(c) = ℓ}; conversely, chans(L) = {c : sender(c) ∈ L or rcpt(c) ∈ L}. For a
singleton set {ℓ} we suppress the curly braces and write chans(ℓ).
Definition 14. Let src, cut, obs ⊆ CH be sets of channels; cut is an undirected
cut (or simply a cut) between src, obs iff
1. src, cut, obs are pairwise disjoint; and
2. every undirected path p1 in ungr(F) from any ℓ1 ∈ ends(obs) to any ℓ2 ∈
ends(src) traverses some member of cut. ///
For instance, in Fig. 4, {c1, c2} is a cut between chans(i) and chans({n1, n2}).
Lemma 15 serves as the heart of the proofs of the two main theorems about cuts,
Thms. 16 and 27.
Lemma 15. Let cut be an undirected cut between src, obs, and let Bo ∈ obs-runs.
Then
Jsrc⊳obs(Bo) =
⋃
Bc∈Jcut⊳obs(Bo)
Jsrc⊳cut(Bc). ///
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Proof. (Key idea.) First, partition LO into three classes. Let left contain ℓ if ℓ
has an endpoint on obs, or if ℓ can be reached by a path not traversing cut. Let
right contain ℓ if ℓ has an endpoint on src, or if ℓ can be reached by a path not
traversing cut. Let mid be the remainder, i.e. locations separated from both left
and right by a channel in cut.
Suppose that A1 witnesses for Bc ∈ Jcut⊳obs(Bo), and A2 witnesses for Bs ∈
Jsrc⊳cut(Bc). A1 and A2 agree for events involving mid, namely the events in Bc
shared between them.
We build a witness A for Bs ∈ Jcut⊳obs(Bo) by taking the events in A1 involv-
ing left∪mid, union the the events in A2 involving right∪mid. A is an execution
because no location has a conflict between events from A1 and A2.
The partial order semantics means that no arbitrary interleaving is needed to
create the instance A. Lemma 15 is in fact a corollary of Lemma 30, which makes
an analogous assertion about a pair of overlapping frames.
Theorem 16. Let cut be an undirected cut between src, obs in F . If there is no
disclosure between src and cut, then there is no disclosure between src and obs.
Proof. Suppose that Bs ∈ src-runs and Bo ∈ obs-runs. We must show Bs ∈
Jsrc⊳obs(Bo). To apply Lemma 15, let A ∈ Exc(F) such that Bo = A|` obs; A exists
by the definition of obs-run. Letting Bc = A |` cut, we have Bc ∈ Jcut⊳obs(Bo).
Since there is no disclosure between cut and src, Bs ∈ Jsrc⊳cut(Bc), and
Lemma 15 applies. ⊓⊔
Example 17. In Fig. 4 let r1 be configured to discard all inbound packets,
and r2 to discard all outbound packets. Then the empty event system is the
only member of {c1, c2}-runs. Hence there is no disclosure between chans(i) and
{c1, c2}. By Thm. 16, there is no disclosure to chans({n1, n2}). ///
So disconnected portions of a frame cannot interfere:
Corollary 18. If there is no path between src and obs in ungr(F), then there is
no disclosure between them.
Proof. Then cut = ∅ is an undirected cut set, and there is only one cut-run,
namely the empty system of events. It is thus compatible with all src-runs. ⊓⊔
Thm. 16 and its analogue Thm. 27, while reminiscent of the max flow/min cut
principle (cf. e.g. [16, Sec. 26.2]), are however quite distinct from it, as the latter
depends essentially on the quantitative structure of network flows. Our results
may also seem reminiscent of the Data Processing Inequality, stating that when
three random variables X,Y, Z form a Markov chain, the mutual information
I(X ;Z) ≤ I(X ;Y ). Indeed, Thm. 16 entails the special case where I(X ;Y ) = 0,
choosing gr(F) to be a single path X → Y → Z. For more on quantitative
information flow and our work, see the conclusion (Sec. 9).
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6 Blur operators
We will now adapt our theory to apply to partial disclosure as well as no dis-
closure. An observer learns something about a source of information when his
observations are compatible with a proper subset of the behaviors possible for
the source. Thus, the natural way to measure what has been learnt is the de-
crease in the set of possible behaviors at the source (see among many sources of
this idea e.g. [19,5]).
This starting point suggests focusing, for every frame and regions of interest
src ⊆ CH and obs ⊆ CH, on the compatibility equivalence relations on src-runs:
Definition 19. Let src, obs ⊆ CH. If B1,B2 are src-runs, we say that they are
obs-equivalent, and write B1 ≈obs B2, iff, for all obs-runs Bo,
B1 ∈ Jsrc⊳obs(Bo) iff B2 ∈ Jsrc⊳obs(Bo) ///
Lemma 20. For each obs, ≈obs is an equivalence relation. ///
No disclosure means that all src-runs are obs-equivalent. Any notion of par-
tial disclosure must respect obs-equivalence, since no observations can possibly
“split” apart obs-equivalent src-runs. Partial disclosures always respect unions
of obs-equivalence classes.
Rather than working directly with these unions of obs-equivalence classes,
we instead focus on functions on sets of runs that satisfy three properties. These
properties express the structural principles on partial disclosure that make our
cut-blur and compositional principles hold. We call operators satisfying the prop-
erties blur operators. Lemma 22 shows that an operator that always returns
unions of obs-equivalence classes is necessarily a blur operator.
When we want to prove results about all notions of partial disclosure, we
prove them for all blur operators. When we want to show a particular relation is
a possible notion of partial disclosure, we show that it generates an equivalence
relation; Lemma 22 then justifies us in applying Thms. 27, 31.
Definition 21. A function f on sets is a blur operator iff it satisfies:
Inclusion: For all sets S, S ⊆ f(S);
Idempotence: f is idempotent, i.e. for all sets S, f(f(S)) = f(S); and
Union: f commutes with unions: If Sa∈I is a family indexed by the set I, then
f(
⋃
a∈I
Sa) =
⋃
a∈I
f(Sa). (1)
S is f -blurred iff f is a blur operator and S = f(S). ///
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By Idempotence, S is f -blurred iff it is in the range of the blur operator f . Since
S =
⋃
a∈S{a}, the Union property says that f is determined by its action on
the singleton subsets of S. Thus, Inclusion could have said a ∈ f({a}).
Monotonicity also follows from the Union property; if S1 ⊆ S2, then S2 =
S0 ∪ S1, where S0 = S2 \ S1. Thus f(S2) = f(S0) ∪ f(S1), so f(S1) ⊆ f(S2).
Lemma 22. Suppose that A is a set, and R is a partition of the elements of A.
There is a unique function fR on sets S ⊆ A such that
1. fR({a}) = S iff a ∈ S and S ∈ R;
2. fR commutes with unions (Eqn. 1).
Moreover, fR is a blur operator.
Proof. Since S =
⋃
a∈S{a}, fR(S) is uniquely defined by the union principle
(Eqn. 1).
Inclusion and Union are immediate from the form of the definition. Idempo-
tence holds because being in the same R-equivalence class is transitive. ⊓⊔
Although every equivalence relation determines a blur operator, the converse is
not true: Not every blur operator is of this form. For instance, consider the set
A = {a, b}, and let f({a}) = {a}, f({b}) = f({a, b}) = {a, b}. Although this f
is not a useful notion of partial disclosure—as it is not generated from any obs
equivalence—Def. 21 identifies the proof principles that make Thm. 27 true.
For intuition about blurs, think of blurring an image: The viewer no longer
knows the details of the scene. The viewer knows only that it was some scene
which, when blurred, would look like this, as the following example indicates.
Example 23. Imaginary Weather Forecasting Inc. (IWF) sells tailored, high-
resolution weather data and forecasts to airlines, airports, and commodity in-
vestment firms, and it sells low-resolution weather data more cheaply to TV and
radio stations. IWF’s low-tier subscribers should not learn higher resolution data
than they have paid for. There is some disclosure about high resolution data be-
cause (e.g.) when low-tier subscribers see warm temperatures, they know that
the high-resolution data is inconsistent with snow. We can formalize this partial
disclosure as a blur.
Suppose IWF creates its low-resolution data d by applying a lossy compres-
sion function comp to high-resolution data D. Then when low-tier subscribers
receive d, they know that the high-resolution data IWF measured from the en-
vironment is some element of comp−1(d) = {D : comp(D) = d}. These sets are
f -blurred where f({D}) = {D′ : comp(D′) = comp(D)}. ///
We will study information disclosure to within blur operators f , which we
interpret as meaning that JC′⊳C(Bc) is f -blurred. Essentially, this is an “upper
bound” on how much information may be disclosed when Bc is observed. The
observer will know an f -blurred set that the behavior at C′ belongs to. However,
the observer cannot infer anything finer than the f -blurred sets.
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Definition 24. Let obs, src ⊆ CH, and let f be a function on sets of src-runs.
F restricts disclosure from src to obs to within f iff f is a blur operator and,
for every obs-run Bo, Jsrc⊳obs(Bo) is an f -blurred set.
We also say that F f -limits src-to-obs flow. ///
At one extreme, the no-disclosure condition is also disclosure to within a blur
operator, namely the blur operator that ignores S and adds all C′-runs:
fall(S) = {A |` C
′ : A ∈ Exc(F)}.
At the other extreme, the maximally permissive security policy is represented as
disclosure to within the identity function fid(S) = S. The blur operator fid also
shows that every frame restricts disclosure to within some blur operator. The
equivalence classes generated by compatibility are always fid-blurred.
F may f -limit src-to-obs flow even when the intersection obs ∩ src is non-
empty, as long as f is not too fine-grained; see below e.g. in Def. 37.
Example 25. Suppose that F is an electronic voting system such as ThreeBal-
lot or its siblings [40]. Some locations LEC are run by the election commission.
We will regard the voters themselves as a set of locations LV . Each voter delivers
a message containing, in some form, his vote for some candidate.
The election officials observe the channels connected to LEC , i.e. chans(LEC).
To determine the correct outcome, they must infer a property of the local run
at chans(LV ), namely, how many votes for each candidate occurred. However,
they should not find out which voter voted for which candidate [17].
We formalize this via a blur operator. Suppose B′ ∈ chans(LV )-runs is a
possible behavior of all voters in LV . Suppose that π is a permutation of LV .
Let π·B′ be the behavior in which each voter ℓ ∈ LV casts not his own actual vote,
but the vote actually cast by π(ℓ). That is, π represents one way of reallocating
the actual votes among different voters. Now for any S ⊆ chans(LV )-runs let
f0(S) = {π · B
′ : B′ ∈ S ∧ π is a permutation of LV }. (2)
This is a blur operator: (i) the identity is a permutation; (ii) permutations are
closed under composition; and (iii) Eqn. 2 implies commutation with unions.
The election commission should learn nothing about the votes of individuals,
meaning that, for any B ∈ chans(LEC)-runs the commission could observe,
Jchans(LV )⊳chans(LEC)(B) is f0-blurred. Permutations of compatible voting pat-
terns are also compatible.
This example is easily adapted to other considerations. For instance, the
commissioners of elections are also voters, and they know how they voted them-
selves. Thus, we could define a (narrower) blur operator f1 that only uses the
permutations that leave commissioners’ votes fixed.
In fact, voters are divided among different precincts in many cases, and tallies
are reported on a per-precinct basis. Thus, we have sets V1, . . . , Vk of voters
registered at the precincts P1, . . . , Pk respectively. The relevant blur function
says that we can permute the votes of any two voters v1, v2 ∈ Vi within the same
precinct. One cannot permute votes between different precincts, since that could
change the tallies in the individual precincts. ///
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Example 26. Suppose in Fig. 4: The inbound interface from i to router r1
discards downward-flowing packets unless their source is an address in i and the
destination is an address in n1, n2. The inbound interface for downward-flowing
to router r2 discards packets unless the destination address is the IP for a web
server www in n1, and the destination port is 80 or 443, or else their source port
is 80 or 443 and their destination port is ≥ 1024.
We filter outbound (upward-flowing) packets symmetrically.
A packet is importable iff its source address is in i and either its destination
is www and its destination port is 80 or 443; or else its destination address is in
n1, n2, its source port is 80 or 443, and its destination port is ≥ 1024.
It is exportable iff, symmetrically, its destination address is in i and either
its source is www and its source port is 80 or 443; or else its source address is in
n1, n2, its destination port is 80 or 443, and its source port is ≥ 1024.
We will write selectB p for the result of selecting those events e ∈ ev(B) that
satisfy the predicate p(e), restricting  to the selected events. Now consider the
operator fi on chans(i)-runs generated as in Lemma 22 from the equivalence
relation:
B1 ≈i B2 iff they agree on all importable events, i.e.:
selectB1 (λe .msg(e) is importable) ∼=
selectB2 (λe .msg(e) is importable).
The router configurations mentioned above are intended to ensure that there is
fi-limited flow from chans(i) to chans({n1, n2}).
This is an integrity condition; it is meant to ensure that systems in n1, n2
cannot be affected by bad (i.e. non-importable) packets from i.
Outbound, the blur fe on chans({n1, n2})-runs is generated from the equiv-
alence relation:
B1 ≈e B2 iff they agree on all exportable events, i.e.:
selectB1 (λe .msg(e) is exportable) ∼=
selectB2 (λe .msg(e) is exportable).
The router configurations are also intended to ensure that there is fe-limited
flow from chans({n1, n2}) to chans(i).
This is a confidentiality condition; it is meant to ensure that external ob-
servers learn nothing about the non-exportable traffic, which was not intended
to exit the organization.
In this example, it is helpful that the exportable and importable packets are
disjoint, and the transmission of one of these packets is never dependent on the
reception of a packet of the other kind. In applications lacking this property,
proving flow limitations is harder. ///
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7 The Cut-Blur Principle
The symmetry of non-disclosure (Lemma 12) no longer holds for disclosure to
within a blur. We have, however, the natural extension of Thm 16:
Theorem 27 (Cut-Blur Principle). Let cut be an undirected cut between
src, obs in F . If F f -limits src-to-cut flow, then F f -limits src-to-obs flow.
Proof. By the hypothesis, f is a blur operator. Let Bo be a obs-run. We want to
show that Jsrc⊳obs(Bo) is an f -blurred set, i.e. Jsrc⊳obs(Bo) = f(Jsrc⊳obs(Bo)).
For convenience, let Sc = Jcut⊳obs(Bo).
By Lemma 15, Jsrc⊳obs(Bo) =
⋃
Bc∈Sc
Jsrc⊳cut(Bc). Thus, we must show that
the latter is f -blurred.
By the assumption that each Jsrc⊳cut(Bc) is f -blurred and by idempotence,
Jsrc⊳cut(Bc) = f(Jsrc⊳cut(Bc)). Now:
⋃
Bc∈Sc
Jsrc⊳cut(Bc) =
⋃
Bc∈Sc
f(Jsrc⊳cut(Bc))
= f(
⋃
Bc∈Sc
Jsrc⊳cut(Bc)),
applying the union property (Eqn. 1). Hence,
⋃
Bc∈Sc
Jsrc⊳cut(Bc) is f -blurred. ⊓⊔
This proof is the reason we introduced the Union principle, rather than simply
considering all closure operators [36]. Eqn. 1 distinguishes those closure operators
that allow the “long distance reasoning” summarized in the proof.
Example 28. The frame of Example 26 has fi-limited flow from chans(i) to the
cut {c1, c2}. Thus, it has fi-limited flow from chans(i) to chans({n1, n2}).
It also has fe-limited flow from chans({n1, n2}) to the cut {c1, c2}. This
implies fe-limited flow to chans(i). ///
7.1 A Compositional Relation between Frames
Our next technical result gives us a way to “transport” a blur security property
from one frame F1 to another frame F2. It assumes that the two frames share
a common core, some set of locations L0. These locations should hold the same
channel endpoints in each of F1,F2, and should engage in the same traces. The
boundary separating L0 from the remainder of F1,F2 necessarily forms a cut
set cut. Assuming that the local runs at cut are respected, blur properties are
preserved from F1 to F2.
Definition 29. A set L0 of locations is shared between F1 and F2 iff F1,F2 are
frames with locations LO1,LO2, endpoints ends1, ends2 and traces traces1, traces2,
resp., where L0 ⊆ LO1 ∩ LO2, and for all ℓ ∈ L0, ends1(ℓ) = ends2(ℓ) and
traces1(ℓ) = traces2(ℓ).
When L0 is shared between F1 and F2, let:
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left0 = {c ∈ CH1 : both endpoints of c are locations ℓ ∈ L0};
cut0 = {c ∈ CH1 : exactly one endpoint of c is a location ℓ ∈ L0}; and
righti = {c ∈ CHi : neither endpoint of c is a location ℓ ∈ L0}, for i = 1, 2.
We will also use C-runs1 and C-runs2 to refer to the local runs of C within F1
and F2, resp.; and J1C′⊳C(B) and J
2
C′⊳C(B) will refer to the compatible C
′ runs
in the frames F1 and F2, resp. ///
Indeed, cut0 is an undirected cut between left0 and righti in Fi, for i = 1 and
2. In an undirected path that starts in left0 and never traverses cut0, each arc
always has both ends in L0. We next prove a two-frame analog of Lemma 15.
Lemma 30. Let L0 be shared between frames F1,F2. Let src ⊆ left0, and Bc ∈
cut0-runs1 ∩ cut0-runs2.
1. J1
src⊳cut0(Bc) = J
2
src⊳cut0(Bc).
2. Assume cut0-runs(F2) ⊆ cut0-runs(F1). Let obs ⊆ right2, and Bo ∈ obs-runs2.
Then
J2src⊳obs(Bo) =
⋃
Bc∈J2cut0⊳obs
(Bo)
J1src⊳cut0(Bc).
Part 1 states that causality acts locally. The variable portions right1, right2 of
F1 and F2 can affect what happens in their shared part left. But it does so only
by changing which cut0-runs are possible. Whenever both frames agree on any
Bc ∈ cut0-runs1 ∩ cut0-runs2, then the left-runs runs compatible with Bc are the
same. The variation between right1, right2 affects the distant behavior within left
only by changing the possible local runs at the boundary cut0.
The assumption cut0-runs(F2) ⊆ cut0-runs(F1) in Part 2 and Thm. 31 is
meant to limit this variability in one direction.
Theorem 31. Suppose that L0 is shared between frames F1,F2, and assume
cut0-runs(F2) ⊆ cut0-runs(F1). Consider any src ⊆ left0 and obs ⊆ right2. If F1
f -limits src-to-cut0 flow, then F2 f -limits src-to-obs flow.
The proof is similar to the proof of the cut-blur principle, which effectively results
from it by replacing Lemma 30 by Lemma 15, and omitting the subscripts on
frames and their local runs. The cut-blur principle is in fact the corollary of
Thm. 31 for F1 = F2.
7.2 Two Applications
Thm. 31 is a useful compositional principle. It implies, for instance in connection
with Example 28, that non-exportable traffic in n1, n2 remains unobservable even
as we vary the top part of Fig. 4.
Example 32. Regarding Fig. 4 as the frame F1, let L0 be the locations below
{c1, c2}, and let cut = {c1, c2}. Let F2 contain L0, cut as shown, and have any
graph structure above cut such that cut remains a cut between the new structure
and F0. Let the new locations have any transition systems such that the local
runs agree, i.e. cut-runs(F2) = cut-runs(F1). Then by Thm. 31, external obser-
vations of chans({n1, n2}) are guaranteed to blur out non-exportable events. ///
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It is appealing that our security goal is independent of changes in the structure
of the internet that we do not control. A similar property holds for the integrity
goal of Example 28 as we alter the internal network. The converse questions—
preserving the confidentiality property as the internal network changes, and the
integrity property as the internet changes—appear to require a different theorem;
cf. [24].
Example 33. Consider a frame F1 representing a precinct, as shown in Fig. 2.
It consists of a set of voters v = {v1, . . . , vk}, a ballot box BB1, and a channel c1
connecting that to the election commission EC . The EC publishes the results
over the channel p to the public Pub.
We have proved that a particular implementation of BB1 ensures that F1
blurs the votes; we formalized this within the theorem prover PVS. That is, if a
pattern of voting in precinct i is compatible with an observation at c1, then any
permutation of the votes at v is also compatible.
The cut-blur principle implies this blur also applies to observations at channel
p to the public. Other implementations of BB1 also achieve this property. Three-
Ballot and VAV [40] appear to have this effect; they involve some additional data
delivered to Pub, namely the receipts for the ballots.1
However, elections generally concern many precincts. Frame F2 contains i
precincts, all connected to the election commission EC (Fig. 3). Taking L0 =
v∪{BB1}, we may apply Thm. 31. We now have cut = {c1}. Thus, to infer that
F2 blurs observations of the voters in precinct 1, we need only check that {c1}
has no new local runs in F2.
By symmetry, each precinct in F2 enjoys the same blur.
Thus—for a given local run at p—any permutation of the votes at v preserves
compatibility in F2, and any permutation of the votes at w preserves compat-
ibility in F2. However, Thm. 31 does not say that any pair of permutations at
v and w must be jointly compatible. That is, does every permutation on v ∪ w
that respects the division between the precinct of the vs and the precinct of the
ws preserve compatibility? Although Thm. 31 does not answer this question, the
answer is yes, as we can see by applying Lemma 40 to F2. ///
Thm. 31 is a tool to justify abstractions. Fig. 4 is a sound abstraction of a variety
of networks, and Fig. 2 is a sound abstraction of the various multiple precinct
instances of Fig. 3.
8 Relating Blurs to Noninterference and Nondeducibility
If we specialize frames to state machines (see Fig. 5), we can reproduce some
of the traditional definitions. Let D = {d1, . . . , dk} be a finite set of domains,
i.e. sensitivity labels; →֒ ⊆ D ×D specifies which domains may influence each
1 Our claim is non-probabilistic. For quantitative conclusions, this no longer holds:
Some permutations are more likely than others, given the receipts [14,37].
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other. We assume →֒ is reflexive, though not necessarily transitive. A is a set of
actions, and dom : A→ D assigns a domain to each action; O is a set of outputs.
M = 〈S, s0, A, δ, obs〉 is a (possibly non-deterministic) state machine with
states S, initial state s0, transition relation δ ⊆ S × A × S, and observation
function obs : S ×D → O. M has a set of traces α, and each trace α determines
a sequence of observations for each domain [45,52,53].
M accepts commands from A along the incoming channels cini from the di;
each command a ∈ A received from di has sensitivity dom(a) = di. M delivers
observations along the outgoing channels couti . The frame requires a little extra
memory, in addition to the states ofM , to deliver outputs over the channels couti .
F being star-like, each A ∈ Exc(F) has a linearly ordered A, since all events
are in the linearly ordered proj(A,M). Let us write:
Ci = {cini , c
out
i } for di’s input and output for M ;
vis(di) = {c
in
j : dj →֒ di} for inputs visible to di;
IN = {cinx : 1 ≤ x ≤ k} for the input channels;
input(A) = A |` IN for all input behavior in A.
Noninterference and nondeducibility. Noninterference [22] and its variants
are defined by purge functions p for each target domain di, defined by recursion
on input behaviors input(A). The original Goguen-Meseguer (GM) purge func-
tion po for di [22] retains the events e ∈ input(A) satisfying the predicate
chan(e) ∈ vis(di).
A purge function for intransitive →֒ relations was subsequently proposed by
Haigh and Young [25]. In the purge function for domain di, any input event e0 ∈
input(A) is retained if input(A) has an increasing subsequence e0  e1  . . .  ej
where dom(chan(ej)) = di and, for each k with 0 ≤ k < j,
chan(ek) ∈ vis(dom(ek+1)).
In [52], van der Meyden’s purge functions yield tree structures instead of sub-
sequences; every path from a leaf to the root in these trees is a subsequence
consisting of permissible effects chan(ek) ∈ vis(dom(ek+1)). This tightens the no-
tion of security, because the trees do not include ordering information between
events that lie on different branches to the root.
We formalize a purge function for a domain di ∈ D as being a function from
executions A to some range set A. It should be sensitive only to input events
in A (condition 1), and it should certainly reflect all the inputs visible to level
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di (condition 2). In most existing definitions, the range A consists of sequences
of input events, though in van der Meyden’s [52], they are trees of input events.
In [13], the range depends on how declassification conditions are defined.
Definition 34. Let F be as in Fig. 5, and A any set. A function p : Exc(F)→ A
is a di-purge function, where di ∈ D, iff
1. input(A) = input(A′) implies p(A) = p(A′);
2. p(A) = p(A′) implies A |` vis(di) = A′ |` vis(di).
If p is a di-purge, A ≈p A′ means p(A) = p(A′). ///
Each purge p determines notions of noninterference and nondeducibility.
Definition 35. Let p be a purge function for di ∈ D. F is p-noninterfering,
written F ∈ NIp, iff, for all A,A′ ∈ Exc(F),
A ≈p A′ implies A |` Ci = A
′ |` Ci.
F is p-nondeducible (F ∈ NDp), iff, for all A,A′ ∈ Exc(F),
A ≈p A′ implies A′ |` IN ∈ JIN⊳Ci(A |` Ci). ///
Here we take non-deducibility to mean that di’s observations provide no more
information about all inputs than the purge p preserves. Thus, A |` Ci is akin to
Sutherland’s view [51, Sec. 5.2]. We have adapted it slightly. Sutherland assumes
that di also observes the outputs on the channels c
out
j where dj →֒ di; we instead
let the definition of machine M replicate them onto couti when desired.
Sutherland’s hidden from could be interpreted as A′ |` {cinj : dj 6 →֒ di}, i.e. the
inputs that would not be visible to di. This agrees with our proposed definition in
the case Sutherland considered, namely the classic GM purge for noninterference.
The assumption A ≈p A′ is meant to extend nondeducibility for other purges.
As expected, noninterference is tighter than nondeducibility [51, Sec. 7]:
Lemma 36. Let p be a purge function for domain di. F ∈ NI
p implies F ∈ NDp.
Proof. Assume that F ∈ NIp and A,A′ ∈ Exc(F), where A ≈p A′.
By the definition, A |` Ci = A′ |` Ci. Thus, JIN⊳Ci(A |` Ci) = JIN⊳Ci(A
′ |` Ci).
But A′ |` IN ∈ JIN⊳Ci(A
′ |` Ci) because A′ is itself a witness. ⊓⊔
NIp and NDp are not equivalent, as NDp has an additional (implicit) existential
quantifier. The witness execution showing that A′ |` IN ∈ JIN⊳Ci(A|` Ci) may differ
from A′ on channels c 6∈ IN ∪ Ci, namely the output channels coutj for j 6= i.
The symmetry of nondisclosure (Lemma 12) does not hold for NIp and NDp.
For instance, relative to the GM purge for flow to di, there may be noninter-
ference for inputs at dj , while there is interference for flow from di to dj . The
asymmetry arises because the events to be concealed are only inputs at the
source, while the observed events are both inputs and outputs [51].
The idea of p-noninterference is useful only when M is deterministic, since
otherwise the outputs observed on couti may differ even when input(A) = input(A
′).
For non-deterministic M , nondeducibility is more natural.
22
Purges and blurs. We can associate a blur operator fp with each purge func-
tion p, such that NDp amounts to respecting the blur operator fp. We regard
NDp as saying that the input/output events on Ci tell di no more about all
the inputs than the purged input p(A) would disclose. We use a compatibility
relation where the observed channels and the source channels overlap on cini .
Definition 37. Let p be a purge function for di, and define the equivalence
relation R ⊆ (IN-runs× IN-runs) by the condition: R(B1,B2) iff
∃A1,A2 ∈ Exc(F) .
∧
j=1,2
Bj = Aj |` IN ∧ A1 ≈
p A2. (3)
Define fp : P(IN-runs)→ P(IN-runs) to close under the R-equivalence classes as
in Lemma 22. ///
In fact, ND is a form of disclosure limited to within a blur:
Lemma 38. Let p be a purge function for domain di. For all F , F ∈ ND
p iff
F fp-limits IN-to-Ci flow.
Proof. 1. NDp implies fp-limited flow. Suppose that F ∈ NDp; Bi ∈ Ci-runs;
and B1 ∈ JIN⊳Ci(Bi). If B2 ∈ f
p(B1), we must show that B2 ∈ JIN⊳Ci(Bi).
By Def. 37 there are A1,A2 so that A1 |` IN = B1 and A2 |` IN = B2 and
A1 ≈p A2. Furthermore, let A witness B1 ∈ JIN⊳Ci(Bi). Then A |` IN = B1 =
A1 |` IN. So Def. 34, Clause 1 says A ≈p A1 and so also A ≈p A2. Since F ∈ ND
p,
A2 |` IN ∈ JIN⊳Ci(A |` Ci). That is, B2 ∈ JIN⊳Ci(Bi) as required.
2. fp-limited flow implies NDp. Assume JIN⊳Ci(Bi) is f
p-blurred for all Bi. We
must show that, for all A1,A2 such that A1 ≈
p A2, (A2 |` IN) ∈ JIN⊳Ci(A1 |` Ci).
So choose executions with A1 ≈p A2. By Def. 37, R(A1 |` IN,A2 |` IN), since
A1,A2 satisfy the condition. Thus, since JIN⊳Ci(A1 |` Ci) is f
p-blurred and con-
tains A1 |` IN, A2 |` IN ∈ JIN⊳Ci(A1 |` Ci). ⊓⊔
Semantic sensitivity. Blur operators provide an explicit semantic representa-
tion of the information that will not be disclosed when flow is limited. This is in
contrast to intransitive non-interference [45,25,52], which considers only whether
the “→֒ plumbing” among domains is correct.
Example 39. We represent Imaginary Weather Forecasting (IWF, see Exam-
ple 23) as a state machine frame as in Fig. 5. It has domains {ws , ℓ, p, cmp} for
the weather service, low-tier customer, premium-tier customer and compression
service respectively. Let →֒ be the smallest reflexive (but intransitive) relation
extending Eqn. 4, where all reports must flow through the compression service:
ws →֒ cmp →֒ p and cmp →֒ ℓ. (4)
The cmp service should compress reports lossily before sending them to ℓ and
compress them losslessly for p. However, a faulty cmp may compress losslessly
for both ℓ and p. Purge functions [25,52] do not distinguish between correct and
faulty cmps. In both cases, all information from ws does indeed pass through
cmp. The blur of Example 23, however, defines the desired goal semantically.
With the faulty cmp, the high-resolution data compatible with the observation
of ℓ is more sharply defined than an f -blurred set. ///
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9 Future Work
We have explored how the graph structure of a distributed system helps to con-
strain information flow. We have established the cut-blur principle. It allows us
to propagate conclusions about limited disclosure from a cut set cut to more
remote parts of the graph. We have also showed a sufficient condition for limita-
tions on disclosure to be preserved under homomorphisms. Most of our examples
concern networks and filtering, but the ideas are much more widely applicable.
Quantitative treatment. It should be possible to equip frames with a quanti-
tative information flow semantics. One obstacle here is that our execution model
mixes some choices which are natural to view probabilistically—for instance, se-
lection between different outputs when both are permitted by an lts—with
others that seem non-deterministic. The choice between receiving an input and
emitting an output is an example of this, as is the choice between receiving in-
puts on different channels. This problem has been studied (e.g. [9,10]), but a
tractable semantics may require new ideas.
A Dynamic Model. Instead of building ends(ℓ) into the frame, so that it
remains fixed through execution, we may alternatively regard it as a component
of the states of the individual locations. Let us regard traces(ℓ) as generated by a
labeled transition system lts(ℓ). Then we may enrich the labels c, v so that they
also involve a sequence of endpoints p ⊆ EP:
(c, v, p).
The transition relation of lts(ℓ) is then constrained to allow a transmission
(c, v, p) in a state only if p ⊆ ends(ℓ) holds in that state, in which case p is
omitted in the next state. A reception (c, v, p) causes p to be added to the next
state of the receiving location.
The cut-blur principle remains true in an important case: A set cut is an
invariant cut between src and obs if it is an undirected cut, and moreover the
execution of the frame preserves this property. Then the cut-blur principle holds
in the dynamic model for invariant cuts.
This dynamic model suggests an analysis of security-aware software using
object capabilities. Object capabilities may be viewed as transmission endpoints.
To use a capability, one transmits a message down the channel to the object itself,
which holds the reception endpoint. To transfer a capability, one transmits its
transmission endpoint down another channel.
McCamant and Ernst [33]’s quantitative approach generates a directed graph
of this sort in memory at runtime. Providing a maximum over all possible runs
would appear to depend on inferring some invariants on the structure of the
graphs. Our methods might be helpful for this.
Cryptographic Masking. Encryption is not a blur. Encrypting messages
makes their contents unavailable in locations lacking the decryption keys. In
particular, locations lacking the decryption key may form a cut set between the
24
source and destination of the encrypted message. However, at the destinations,
where the keys are available, the messages can be decrypted and their contents
observed. Thus, the cut-blur theorem says it would be wrong to view encryption
as a blur in this set-up: Its effects can be undone beyond the cut.
Instead, we enrich the model. The messages on a channel are not observed
in their specificity. Instead, the observation is a projection of messages on the
channel. One could represent this projection using the Abadi-Rogaway [1] pat-
tern operator ⊓⊔. Alternatively, one could rely directly on the cryptographic in-
distinguishability relation [4].
In general, this means applying the compatibility function JC′⊳C(B) not only
to local C-runs B, but also to their projections JC′⊳C(proj(B)) for projection
functions of interest. This change is quite compatible with many of our proof
methods, but the statements of theorems will need adaptation. We would like
to use the resulting set-up to reason about cryptographic voting systems, such
as Helios and Preˆt-a`-Voter [3,47].
We also intend to provide tool support for defining relevant blurs and estab-
lishing that they limit disclosure in several application areas.
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A Some Lemmas and Proofs
Lemma 13.
1. Suppose C0 ⊆ C1 and C′0 ⊆ C
′
1. If F has no disclosure from C1 to C
′
1, then
F has no disclosure from C0 to C′0.
2. When C1, C2, C3 ⊆ CH,
JC3⊳C1(B1) ⊆
⋃
B2∈JC2⊳C1(B1)
JC3⊳C2(B2).
Proof. 1. Suppose B0 is a C0-run, and B′0 is a C
′
0-run. We want to show that
B′0 ∈ JC′0⊳C0(B0).
Since they are local runs, there exist A0,A′0 ∈ Exc(F) such that B0 = A0 |` C0
and B′0 = A
′
0 |` C
′
0. But let B1 = A0 |` C1 and let B
′
1 = A
′
0 |` C
′
1. By no-disclosure,
B′1 ∈ JC′1⊳C1(B1). So there is an A ∈ Exc(F) such that B1 = A |` C1 and B
′
1 =
A |` C′1.
However, then A witnesses for B′0 ∈ JC′0⊳C0(B0): After all, since C0 ⊆ C1,
A |` C0 = (A |` C1) |` C0. Similarly for the primed versions.
2. Suppose that B3 ∈ JC3⊳C1(B1), so that there exists an A ∈ Exc(F) such that
B1 = A |` C1 and B3 = A |` C3. Letting B2 = A |` C2, the execution A ensures that
B2 ∈ JC2⊳C1(B1) and B3 ∈ JC3⊳C2(B2). ⊓⊔
We now consider different frames F1,F2 that overlap on a common subset
L0, and show how local runs in the two can be pieced together. In this context,
we use the notation of Def. 29.
Lemma 40. Let L0 be shared between frames F1,F2. Let
Blc ∈ (left ∪ cut)-runs1 and Brc ∈ (right2 ∪ cut)-runs2
agree on cut, i.e. Blc |` cut = Brc |` cut. Then there is an A ∈ Exc(F2) such that
Blc = A |` (left ∪ cut) and Brc = A |` (right2 ∪ cut).
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Proof. Since Blc and Brc are local runs of F1,F2 resp., they are restrictions of
executions, so choose A1 ∈ Exc(F1) and A2 ∈ Exc(F2) so that Blc = A1 |` (left ∪
cut) and Brc = A2 |` (right2 ∪ cut). Now define A by stipulating:
ev(A) = ev(Blc) ∪ ev(Brc) (5)
A = the least partial order extending Blc ∪ Brc . (6)
Since A1,A2 agree on cut, ev(A) = ev(Blc |` left)∪ev(Brc), and we could have used
the latter as an alternate definition of ev(A), as well as the symmetric restriction
of Brc to right2 leaving Blc whole.
The definition of A as a partial order is sound, because there are no cycles
in the union (6). Cycles would require A1 and A2 to disagree on the order of
events in their restrictions to cut, contrary to assumption. Likewise, the finite-
predecessor property is preserved: x0 A x1 iff x0, x1 belong to the same B?c and
are ordered there, or else there is an event in B?c |` cut which comes between them.
So the events preceding x1 form the finite union of finite sets. Thus, A ∈ ES(F2).
Moreover, A is an execution A ∈ Exc(F2): If ℓ ∈ L0, then proj(A, ℓ) =
proj(Blc, ℓ), and the latter is a trace in traces1(ℓ) = traces2(ℓ). If ℓ 6∈ L0, then
proj(A, ℓ) = proj(Brc, ℓ), and the latter is a trace in traces2(ℓ).
There is no ℓ with channels in both left and right2. ⊓⊔
What makes this proof work? Any one location either has all of its channels lying
in left0 ∪ cut0 or else all of them lying in righti ∪ cut. When piecing together the
two executions A1,A2 into a single execution A, no location needs to be able
to execute a trace that comes partly from A1 and partly from A2. This is what
determines our definition of cuts using the undirected graph ungr(F).
We next prove the two-frame analog of Lemma 15.
Lemma 30. Let L0 be shared between frames F1,F2. Let src ⊆ left, and Bc ∈
cut0-runs1 ∩ cut0-runs2.
1. J1
src⊳cut0(Bc) = J
2
src⊳cut0(Bc).
2. Assume cut0-runs(F2) ⊆ cut0-runs(F1). Let obs ⊆ right2, and Bo ∈ obs-runs2.
Then
J2
src⊳obs(Bo) =
⋃
Bc∈J2cut0⊳obs
(Bo)
J1
src⊳cut0(Bc).
Proof. 1. First, we show that Bs ∈ J1src⊳cut0(Bc) implies Bs ∈ J
2
src⊳cut0(Bc).
Let A1 witness for Bs ∈ J1src⊳cut(Bc), and let A2 witness for Bc ∈ cut-runs2.
Define
Blc = A1 |` (left ∪ cut) and Brc = A2 |` (right2 ∪ cut).
Now the assumptions for Lemma 40 are satisfied. So let A ∈ Exc(F2) restrict to
Blc and Brc as in the conclusion. Thus, A |` src = Bs.
For the converse, we rely on the symmetry of “L0 is shared between frames
F1,F2.”
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2. By the assumption, whenever Bc ∈ J2cut⊳obs(Bo), then also Bc ∈ cut-runs1. Thus,
we can apply part 1 after using Lemma 13:
J2src⊳obs(Bo) ⊆
⋃
Bc∈J2cut0⊳obs
(Bo)
J2src⊳cut0(Bc)
⊆
⋃
Bc∈J2cut0⊳obs
(Bo)
J1
src⊳cut0(Bc).
For the reverse inclusion, assume that Bs ∈ J1src⊳cut0(Bc), where Bc ∈ J
2
cut0⊳obs
(Bo).
Thus, we can apply Lemma 40, obtaining A ∈ Exc(F2) which agrees with Bs,
Bc, and Bo. So A witnesses for Bs ∈ J2src⊳obs(Bo). ⊓⊔
We now turn to the one-frame corollary, which we presented earlier as Lemma 15.
Lemma 15. Let cut be an undirected cut between src, obs, and let Bo ∈ src-runs.
Then
Jsrc⊳obs(Bo) =
⋃
Bc∈Jcut⊳obs(Bo)
Jsrc⊳cut(Bc).
Proof. Define L0 to be the smallest set of locations such that
1. ℓ ∈ L0 if chans(ℓ) ∩ src 6= ∅;
2. L0 is closed under reachability by paths that do not traverse cut.
L0 is shared between F and itself. Moreover, for the set of channels cut0 defined
in Def. 29, we have cut0 ⊆ cut: cut0 is the part of cut that actually lies on the
boundary of L0.
By Lemma 30, we have
Jsrc⊳obs(Bo) =
⋃
Bc∈Jcut0⊳obs(Bo)
Jsrc⊳cut(Bc).
Since cut0 ⊆ cut,
⋃
Bc∈Jcut0⊳obs(Bo)
Jsrc⊳cut(Bc) ⊆
⋃
Bc∈Jcut⊳obs(Bo)
Jsrc⊳cut(Bc).
For the converse, suppose that Bs ∈ Jsrc⊳cut(Bc), for Bc ∈ Jcut⊳obs(Bo). Then there
is A such that A |` src = Bs and A |` obs = Bo. Thus, Bs ∈ Jsrc⊳cut(A |` cut0) and
A |` cut0 ∈ Jcut0⊳obs(Bo). ⊓⊔
The cut-blur principle is also the one-frame corollary of Thm. 31. The proofs
are very similar.
Theorem 31. Suppose that L0 is shared between frames F1,F2, and assume
cut-runs(F2) ⊆ cut-runs(F1). Consider any src ⊆ left and obs ⊆ right2. If F1
f -limits src-to-cut flow, then F2 f -limits src-to-obs flow.
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Proof. By the hypothesis, f is a blur operator. Letting Bo ∈ obs-runs2, we want
to show that J2
src⊳obs(Bo) is an f -blurred set, i.e. J
2
src⊳obs(Bo) = f(J
2
src⊳obs(Bo)).
For convenience, let Sc = J
2
cut⊳obs(Bo). By Lemma 30,
J2src⊳obs(Bo) =
⋃
Bc∈Sc
J1src⊳cut(Bc);
thus, we must show that the latter is f -blurred. By the assumption that each
J1
src⊳cut(Bc) is f -blurred, we have J
1
src⊳cut(Bc) = f(J
1
src⊳cut(Bc)). Using this and
the union property (Eqn. 1):
⋃
Bc∈Sc
J1src⊳cut(Bc) =
⋃
Bc∈Sc
f(J1src⊳cut(Bc))
= f(
⋃
Bc∈Sc
J1
src⊳cut(Bc)),
Hence, J2
src⊳obs(Bo) is f -blurred. ⊓⊔
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